The Book · Chapter 26 of 28
Chapter 26Constitutional Limits on Computational Substitution
Which limits on computational substitution should be categorical, which should depend on context, and what evidence could justify revising either kind?
The chapter develops
The principle of Anti-Automation Constitutionalism, with its six outcome classifications.
Anti-Automation Constitutionalism
Some decisions and relationships must remain outside complete automation.
Doctrine 21 of the Book’s twenty-one. A proposed formulation, not an enacted rule.
Summary
Even faithful representation, fair procedure and an extensive audit trail may leave a prior question unanswered: may this legal function be computationally substituted at all? This chapter develops Anti-Automation Constitutionalism as a framework for reasoned limits, ranging from routine and conditional automation to decision support, human determination, moratorium and prohibition. It examines protected judgments and relationships, digital exclusion, irreversibility, institutional dependence and the capacity to maintain alternatives. Comparative cases and instruments illustrate narrower legal boundaries while the chapter confronts objections based on human bias, scarcity and superior machine performance. Its constitutional defence rests on dignity, answerability and the allocation of coercive power, rather than a claim that humans decide more accurately. The limits remain reviewable, but their grounds matter: empirical restrictions may change with evidence, whereas constitutional reservations require competent legal change or a persuasive reconsideration of the allocation itself.
- computational substitution
- non-delegable functions
- human determination
- non-digital access
- non-automation assessment
- moratoria
- constitutional resilience
- reviewable limits
The chapter text
The text of this chapter is read in the Codex, by members and owners of the Book. Membership opens every published chapter; the Book gives you all twenty-eight for good.